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LAND TRUST SECRECY-PERHAPS
A SECRET NO MORE
The legal and political processes intersect frequently and nowhere
has this intersection been more evident than in the controversy surround-
ing the legislation against land trust secrecy. Recent newspaper disclo-
sures1 of windfall profits reaped by public officials and prominent private
individuals illustrate how land trusts have become a popular financial shel-
ter for those who seek to avoid public scrutiny. To curtail certain abuses
of the land trust device, a number of bills have been introduced in the Illi-
nois General Assembly which focus upon the evils inherent in the present
statutes and attempt to devise a new land trust law that will effectively
serve the public interest.
It must first be understood that the concept of the land trust itself is
not under attack. Excluding secrecy, advantages such as non-resident and
multiple ownership, readily available financing, probate avoidance, and
attractive tax shelters properly can be obtained through the use of the
land trust concept.2  The Illinois courts upheld the basic theory of land
trusts as early as 1920. 3  More recently, in dicta, the Illinois Supreme
Court affirmed the use of land trusts by stating "[t]he law of this State and
the decisions of reviewing courts for more than 80 years have encouraged
public reliance upon the real property concepts exemplified in the land trust
now before us."1
4
1. See, e.g., Chicago Sun-Times, May 10, 1973, at 34, col. 1; Chicago Sun-
Times, June 9, 1973, at 1, col. 1.
2. The land trust concept is relatively simple. Real property is transferred by
the purchaser or owners to a trustee. However, unlike an ordinary trust the trustee
holds both legal and equitable title for the benefit of the named beneficiary. The
resulting interest of the beneficiary in the trust is solely that of personal property.
In essence the beneficiary, who is technically the owner of the real estate, has all
the benefits of ownership without actual ownership of the realty. Establishing the
land trust essentially changes the owner or purchasers real property to personal
property. The trustee has power to deal freely with the realty except as restricted
by the trust agreement which was established by the beneficiary. For a complete
discussion the land trust concept and its advantages see W. Garrett, Land Trusts
2-8 (Chicago Title and Trust Co., 4th rev. Oct. 1971).
3. Kerr v. Kotz, 299 Il. 465, 132 N.E. 625 (1921), aff'g 218 Ill. App. 654
(1920) (abstract decision); Chicago Title and Trust v. Mercantile Trust and Savings
Bank, 300 111. App. 329, 20 N.E.2d 992 (1939).
4. Chicago Fed. Say. and Loan Ass'n. v. Cacciatore, 25 Ill. 2d 535, 547,
185 N.E.2d 670, 676 (1962). While the primary thrust of the case does not
attack the validity of the land trust doctrine, the court points out that because so
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While the land trust concept has been firmly sanctioned by the Illinois
Supreme Court, this has not protected the concept from being perverted by
unscrupulous individuals. Understandably, almost any legal device can
be used to create an improper result. But, in the case of land trusts it ap-
pears that the secrecy aspects have heavily encouraged impropriety.
Theoretically there are many situations where it is desirable for owner-
ship of property not be disclosed.5 On the other hand, numerous abuses
can result from the same desire to remain anonymous. For example, the
most frequently discussed abuse of secrecy, prior to the political wind-
fall scandals, concerned slum owners. Slum owners conceal their identities
through the use of land trusts, reaping enormous profits from the plight
of minorities,6 and without ever having to account for their misdeeds.
In an attempt to combat that particular abuse, the Illinois General As-
sembly enacted the first of its present disclosure statutes in 1963. 7 The
statute provided that a trustee of a land trust must disclose the identity of
the trust beneficiaries within ten days after receipt of written notice of
violation of a building code or similar ordinance. At first glance this
statute would seem to effectively prevent the concealment of slum pro-
perty ownership through the use of the land trust. The statute, however,
has failed to achieve its intended effect.
In 1969, the Illinois General Assembly, acting in what appeared to be
anticipation of future improprieties, enacted a statute requiring that
before any contract relating to ownership or use of real property is entered
into by and between the State or any local governmental unit . . . and a
trustee who has title to such real property . . . such trustee . . . must
disclose the identity of every owner and beneficiary having any interest,
real or personal, in such property.8
much money has been invested in land trust arrangements their validity must be
relied on.
5. See Garrett, supra note 2 at 6. The author gives examples of when secrecy
may be desirable. For instance, where tracts of land are being purchased in
parcels, it may help for negotiation purposes to keep the identity of the buyer secret.
The author states: "A land owner may simply not wish to disclose his ownership
for the wholly proper reason that he wants his real estate ownership to be private
just as his stock, bond or money ownership is private." id.
6. Numerous newspaper and magazine articles have been written on slumlord
abuses. For a brief discussion on how secret land trusts are used to accomplish
improper results, see Garrett, supra note 2 at 5. See also Sax and Hiestand,
Slumlordism As A Tort, 65 MICH. L. REv. 869 (1967); Dahl, A White Slumlord
Confesses, ESQUIRE, July, 1966 at 92. "The good guy, the mildly greedy, humanoid
slumlord, can't last. . . . To be a good investor, he must learn to reduce people
to cash value .. " Id. at 94.
7. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 80, § 81 (1971).
8. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 102, § 3.1 (1971).
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It should be noted that the statute not only requires disclosure but goes on
to add that
[t]his section shall be liberally construed to accomplish the purpose of re-
quiring the identification of the actual parties benefitting from any trans-
action with a governmental unit or agency involving the procurement of
the ownership or use of real property thereby. 9
Section 3.1 would appear adequately to protect the public against such
scandals as the "Airport Parking Lot Deal," 10 but again has failed to do
SO.
The disclosure statutes have been ineffectivly applied due to their
vagueness, although not in a constitutional sense." For example, the dis-
closure requirements in connection with building code violations12 com-
mands that notice be given to the local government departments or agen-
cies responsible for enforcement of the code, but does not prescribe any
procedure to govern the disclosures.13  The statute requiring disclosure
of beneficiaries when the trustee is contracting with a governmental body' 4
does not indicate to whom the disclosure must be made nor does it state
that the disclosure, if made, is to be declared a matter of public record.
The statute is weak in that it fails to specify a procedure for revealing the
identity of the trust beneficiaries. However, a public official who violates
section 3.1 is guilty of a Class 4 felony and will have his official position
vacated as part of the judgment of the court.'
It must be pointed out that while the disclosure statutes themselves do
9. Id. § 3.1 (emphasis added). The Statute is aimed at disclosing the true
beneficiary of the trust not merely the "strawman" who the actual beneficial
owners may utilize to hide their identity.
10. The title "Airport Parking Lot Deal" comes from a series of articles pub-
lished by the Chicago Sun-Times in December, 1972, revealing Alderman Thomas
Keane's (31st Ward-Chicago) secret land trust ties to the Airport Parking Corp. of
America (APCOA), which had a lucrative city parking contract at O'Hare Interna-
tional Airport. Alderman Keane, as a City Council member, voted in favor of
granting the contract to APCOA without revealing his land trust ties. Chicago
Sun-Times, Dec. 10-17, 1972.
11. While it appears that an argument can be made that the statutes violate
5th and 14th Amendment "due process," the question has never been litigated in
the courts.
12. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 80, § 81 (1971).
13. UNDER ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 17 , § 61, as amended, ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
17A! § 62 (Supp. 1972), locations of buildings in violation of ordinances are to
be posted publicly. However, when it comes to disclosures of beneficial interests,
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 80, § 81 (1971) is controlling and does not compel that dis-
closures be made public.
14. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 102, § 3.1 (1971).
15. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 102, § 4 (Supp. 1972), amending ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
102, § 4 (1971).
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not totally fulfill their stated purpose, thre are other means available
to discover those who hide behind land trusts.16 While these methods may
be effective in determining who held the beneficial interest after the fact,
they accomplish little in preventing the commission of misdealings, the
hatching of schemes, and the reaping of windfalls, all of which ultimately
victimize the public.
Often it takes a public upheaval after corruption has been exposed to
compel legislative action. So it was with the Illinois General Assembly
which introduced bills to abolish or restrict the use of the land trust only
after the revelation of land trust schemes involving highly placed persons.
House Bill 150817 is the least comprehensive of the bills introduced.
The bill calls for disclosure of all beneficial interests in real property held
in a land trust whenever the trustee or beneficiary makes "application
to the State of Illinois or to any of its agencies or political subdivisions
for any benefit, authorization, license or permit. . . ,,as It also provides
for disclosure of beneficiaries, "[W]henever any trustee of a land trust,
or any beneficiary of a land trust, is a party plaintiff or defendant in any
case in the courts of this State. . .. "19
The problem with House Bill 1508 appears to be that it retains the weak-
nesses found in the current statutes. The Bill provides no set procedure
for disclosure nor does it attempt to prevent improprieties before they
occur. It appears that this Bill does not include anything that the present
disclosure statutes do not.20 Its only innovation is that disclosure would
be required in the case of a lawsuit. The Bill states that disclosure would
16. It may be speculated that the identity of land trust beneficiaries might be
learned through the use of discovery procedures set forth in ILL. REv. STAT. ch.
110A, § 201 (1971). This question has not been litigated to any point where
precedent has been established. It may also be argued that if a disclosure of interest
document has been filed with the State or one of its agencies, it should rank as a
public record open to public inspection under ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 116, § 43.5
(1971), and ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 30, § 27 (1971). The Local Records Act, ILL.
REv. STAT. ch. 116, § 43.101 (1971) provides that reports and records of the use
of public funds are public records open to public inspection. This might conceivably
be read to include disclosures in real estate transactions involving land trusts.
17. H.B. 1508, 78th Ill. Gen. Assembly (1973) (introduced April 12, 1973)
[hereinafter cited as H.B. 1508].
18. H.B. 1508, § 2. The identification of each beneficiary must be made in the
application. The disclosure must identify him by name and address and define his
interest in the land trust.
19. H.B. 1508, § 3. The disclosure must be made in the first pleading of such
party relative to "any real property material to any issue or any point in question in
such case or proceedings."
20. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 102, § 3.1 (1971). It would appear that the present
statute covering disclosure in any contract with the State would essentially include
everything within the scope of H.B. 1508,
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be required when it is "material to any issue or any point in ques-
tion .... -21 Considering the fact that there is little litigation in the land
trust area, it becomes difficult to imagine this as an effective means of
disclosing actual beneficiaries.
Senate Bill 95322 begins to direct itself to some of the basic failures of
the present statutes. The Bill provides that the state or any local govern-
mental unit is prohibited from buying, leasing, selling, giving, receiving
or renting any property to or from a land trust unless all the beneficiaries
have been disclosed. The Bill is extremely thorough in establishing a step-
by-step disclosure procedure, 23 and even provides a form24 stating what
information must be provided. The Bill seeks disclosure before any
contract is entered into, thereby preventing a conflict of interest situation
from arising. The statute also requires that "[a]ll notices wherever filed
shall be public records. '25 The Bill also provides for imposition of
strict penalties. 26  If this section is implemented to its fullest extent one
of the major deficiencies in the present statutes will be overcome.
While Senate Bill 953 is precise in establishing its goals, it fails by
limiting the scope of those goals. The proposal deals only with activi-
ties in which the state is involved. But, as previously pointed out, dis-
closure of secret interests is vitally important in areas in which the state
is not involved, for instance, slumlord situations. While the Bill will ade-
quately combat the use of land trusts by corrupt public officials, its effect
on the overall secrecy problem will be less than complete.
21. H.B. 1508, § 3.
22. S.B. 953, 78th Il. Gen. Assembly (1973) (Introduced April 14, 1973),
as amended, May 25, 1973 [hereinafter cited as S.B. 953].
23. S.B. 953, § 3(a) provides:
Before any contract is entered into between the State or unit of local
government and a person having an interest in real estate, the State or unit
of local government must:
(1) File . . . a Notice executed by a person having an interest in real
estate 10 days prior to entering into any contract concerning real
estate.
24. S.B. 953, § 5 is entitled "Notice of Interest in Real Estate Filed Pursuant to
Governmental Real Estate Disclosure Act."
25. S.B. 953, § 5(d).
26. S.B. 953, § 6(b) provides:
Any person of a unit of local government or a condemning body who will-
fully violates this Act shall be guilty of a Class 4 Felony. In addition
thereto, any office or official position held by any person so convicted
shall become vacant, and shall be so declared as part of the judgment of
court; and the person so convicted may not hold any office or position of
trust and confidence in this state until two years after the date of such
conviction.
Section 6(c) states that a fine of not more than $10,000 but not less than $5,000
may also be levied.
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The last and most inclusive bill introduced in 1973, is House Bill 429.27
The sponsors hope to abolish the use of secret land trusts in their entirety.
If enacted, the statute will require disclosure of all beneficial interests,
including those land trusts created before the effective date of the statute.
This Bill attempts to rectify the problems created by the present disclosure
statute by establishing a procedure for disclosure, 28 by requiring the dis-
closures to become part of the public record29 and by providing stiff
penalties for non-compliance.
30
Perhaps the greatest drawback to the Bill is that it is too "inclusive."
The sponsors fail to recognize that secrecy does have some useful, legiti-
mate aspects.8 1 The conclusion that secrecy is evil per se and under no
circumstances can it be lawfully useful is erroneous. It is indeed short-
sighted to condemn all land trusts in order to rectify a limited number of
abuses.
The fact that each of the bills introduced has shortcomings should not
be disheartening, for it is seldom that a totally perfect piece of legisla-
tion is ever written. Often it is not until the courts have interpreted a
statute that one can begin to see whether it has completely or even partially
accomplished its purpose. Regardless of which bill, if any, the legisla-
ture passes, the court will have to make several critical determinations.
First, while House Bill 1508 and Senate Bill 953 refer to contracts to
27. H.B. 429, 78th I11. Gen. Assembly (1973) (introduced February 27, 1973)
[hereinafter cited as H.B. 429].
28. H.B. 429, § 3(b) states:
In every land trust created after the effective date of this Act each bene-
ficiary thereof must be identified by name and address and his interest
therein defined. The trust agreement containing such disclosure of inter-
est must be recorded or registered together with, or incorporated in full in,
the Deed in Trust to which such agreement relates as an integral part of
the conveyance made by the land trust.
H.B. 429, § 3(c) requires that land trust agreements in effect prior to the effective
date of the statute must be modified "to conform them to the recording and regis-
tering requirements of land trusts created under this Act."
29. H.B. 429, § 2, the definition section, states:
"Recorded" or "Registered" means that a public record has been caused to
be made of a land trust by the filing or registering the written evidence
thereof in the Office of the Recorder of Deeds or the Registrar of Titles.
30. H.B. 429, § 4 provides:
Any violation of this Act shall render the land trust void and all interests
created thereby shall be in the record title holder or holders as they existed
prior to the execution of the land trust agreement. Any person who will-
fully fails or refuses to make disclosure of beneficial interests in real prop-
erty as required of him by this Act is guilty of a Business Offense and
shall be fined not less than $5,000.
31. See note 5, supra for Garrett's discussion on when secrecy may be desirable.
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which the state is a party, they do not specifically provide for contracts
such as concession agreements.3 2 In the case of the "Airport Parking Lot
Deal" it was contended that the contract involved was listed as a conces-
sion agreement, and therefore did not require disclosure under the present
statutes.
Secondly, a determination that the courts must make which affects all
three bills, concerns the use of nominees. The nominee statute3 8 seems
to indicate that nominees could be used to act as agents of the trustee
and be listed as beneficiaries when they in effect would not have any
personal interest in the property.3 4  If it is determined that the use of
nominees is to be permitted, it is possible the objectives of the bills will
be easily circumvented.
The difficulty that the Illinois legislature is having in attempting to
legislate in the land trust area is partially due to the fact that they lack
established guidelines from the experience of other states. While several
states have adopted land trust laws,35 these laws are still in the develop-
mental stage.36 Hence, it appears that Illinois will have to assume the
role of innovator in land trust disclosure law.
Will the efforts of the legislators to cure the secrecy problems associated
with land trusts be successful? Presently it is doubtful that the bills intro-
duced will pass the Illinois General Assembly. House Bill 1508 passed
in the House of Representatives but will probably be amended prior to
any further action. Senate Bill 953, although sponsored by thirty sena-
32. A concession agreement is a grant ordinarily applied to the grant of specific
privileges by a government.
33. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 148, § 36 (1971).
34. Id. The statute states:
Unless it is otherwise provided by the instrument creating the trust, the
trustee of any trust heretofore or hereafter created may cause . . . prop-
erty, real or personal, belonging to the trust to be registered and held in
the name of a nominee . . . without mention of the trust in any instru-
ment or record constituting or evidencing title thereto.
35. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-17.1 (1969); FLA. STAT. § 689.071(1)-(6) (1969);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 59-03-02 (Supp. 1973); IND. ANN. STAT. § 30-4-2-13 (1972).
36. The typical attitude concerning land trusts in other states can be found in
Comment, The Virginia Land Trust-An Overlooked Title Holding Device for In-
vestment, Business and Estate Planning Purposes, 30 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 73,
92-93 (1966), where it is stated that land trusts have not become popular because of
the natural inertia of attorneys against adopting a new device. Another
is that banks and trust companies in Virginia generally have not publicized
the advantages because the land trust decreases the volume of business ac-
cruing to attorneys, real estate brokers, and title insurance companies.
Another possible reason is that until there have been some Virginia deci-
sions confirming that the interest of beneficiaries under a land trust is
personalty, there may remain some doubt in skeptical minds.
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tors, also appears headed for defeat and has been amended at least
twice.8 7 House Bill 429 has been placed in Interim Committee and will
not come up for discussion until January, 1974.
As mentioned previously, the legal and political processes often inter-
sect. This is the most cogent explanation for the slow movement of the
legislature. Land trusts are most widely used in Cook County and ad-
joining suburban areas.88 Legislation which affects Cook County most
directly often becomes law only after a great deal of discussion, thought
and debate. Whether or not these particular bills are passed, the impetus
to reform the present secrecy and disclosure laws has been provided.
Statutes, whether in the form of new ethics or disclosure bills will con-
tinue to be introduced and eventually will become law. The time has
come for a new accountability for those who place their own selfish in-
terests above the interests of the public welfare.
Carl S. Tominberg
37. S.B. 953 has been amended on two occasions. The initial amendment was
offered by the Judiciary Committee on May 14, 1973; the second was offered by
Senator Edward Scholl (R-Chicago) on May 25, 1973.
38. Supra note 2, at 1. "There are roughly 3 million parcels of real estate in
Cook County, and it is estimated that at one time or another fully 80 percent of
these parcels have been in land trust." Letter from Illinois Legislative Council to
Rep. Peggy Smith Martin, May 10, 1973.
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